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A Theater of Ideas
Performance and Performativity 
in Kierkegaard’s Repetition
Martijn Boven
It has always been one of the tasks of philosophy to develop categories 
that give an intelligible form to knowledge. This is no different for Kierke-
gaard. He has developed important categories such as repetition, the instant, 
anxiety, despair, and so forth. However, there is something odd about these 
categories: it is very hard to find a clear and unequivocal definition of them. 
In different ways, each of them is shrouded in uncertainty. This uncertainty is 
not the result of a lack of talent but a deliberate effect. In Kierkegaard’s view, 
there are two types of categories: logical and existential. Logical categories 
can ideally exhaust their object in such a way that there is no uncertainty 
left. This is different in the case of existential categories. These categories will 
never be able ideally to exhaust their object because they are dependent on 
the person who is using them. Kierkegaard tries to solve this difficulty by pre-
serving the uncertainty inherent in these categories. An example can clarify 
this. One of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms tells about a witty fellow who divided 
humankind into three classes: officers, servant girls, and chimney sweeps. “In 
my opinion,” the pseudonym writes, “this remark is not only witty but also 
profound, and it would take great speculative talent to make a better clas-
sification. If a classification does not ideally exhaust its object, the accidental 
is preferable in every way, because it sets the imagination in motion” (SKS 
4:37 / R 162). The sheer impossibility of establishing an exhaustive classifica-
tion of humankind shows that it makes more sense to rely on an accidental 
and unessential classification than on a serious and essential one. Any clas-
sification will at best approximate the truth, without ever reaching it. But an 
accidental classification has the added advantage of activating the imagina-
tion and forcing the recipient to produce a creative response. This is exactly 
the kind of performative effect that Kierkegaard tries to achieve.
In this essay, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s oeuvre can be seen as a the-
ater of ideas.1 This argument is developed in three steps. First, I will briefly 
introduce a theoretical framework for addressing the theatrical dimension 
of Kierkegaard’s works. This framework is based on a distinction between 
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“performative writing strategies” and “categories of performativity.”2 As a 
second step, I will focus on Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychol-
ogy, “by Constantin Constantius,” one of the best examples of Kierkegaard’s 
innovative way of doing philosophy. This strange and elusive book intro-
duces the difficult and counterintuitive notion of repetition. Repetition is a 
category of performativity that aims to activate the subjectivity of the reader. 
This performative effect is achieved by confronting the reader with an “unre-
solved” existential problem that is not yet drawn into clarity but is staged in 
all its confusions and contradictions. Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Constantius 
relies here on a performative writing strategy that is animated by a dialectic 
of advance and withdrawal. In the last and third step, I will analyze Constan-
tius’s own reflection on the performative dimension of his text. Constantius 
has left several clues behind, each of which suggests that he deliberately 
developed a performative writing strategy.
Theoretical Framework: Performance and Performativity
Many interpreters of Kierkegaard have studied his poetics of indirect com-
munication as a maieutic practice that takes place on the borderline between 
philosophy and literature. Without denying the influence of literature on 
Kierkegaard’s works, I will focus on a different discipline of art: the theater.3 
It is well known that Kierkegaard was an ardent lover of theater and could 
often be found in the Royal Theater in Copenhagen. He composed several 
minor writings about theater and remained fascinated with the subject to 
the end of his life. Although these minor writings have never received much 
attention, they can shed some light on the performative dimension of Kierke-
gaard’s works.4 “Phister as Captain Scipio” is exemplary in this respect. 
In this short essay, the pseudonym Procul analyzes how the Danish actor 
Joachim Ludvig Phister plays the role of Scipio, an alcoholic who is a captain 
in the Papal Police Corps.
To exploit the comic potential of this character, Phister has to make a dou-
ble movement. On the one hand, he has to play Captain Scipio as someone 
who is constantly concealing that he is an alcoholic. On the other hand, he 
has to make sure that the viewer begins to develop a suspicion of this hidden 
condition. Nevertheless, Phister’s aim is not to expose Scipio as a cheat and 
an alcoholic, but to hint at the contradiction between his outer appearance 
as an authoritative figure and the hidden condition that he tries to conceal. 
This contradiction is heightened when it is “his duty to clear out a pub where 
the people are dead drunk” (SKS 16:133 / “PCS” 334). Procul is so impressed 
with Phister’s performance because he is able to keep the concealment and 
the disclosure in tension with each other. The way Phister conceals Captain 
Scipio’s hidden condition betrays that something is not right. By drawing the 
viewer’s attention to the concealment, he discloses that Captain Scipio hides 
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something, but what he hides still has to be uncovered. In other words, the 
disclosure takes place telegraphically, in an indirect and a nonverbal way 
(compare SKS 16:139 / “PCS” 340). Throughout his oeuvre, Kierkegaard is 
fascinated by this tension between concealment and disclosure. Like Phister, 
he tries to communicate something that cannot be shown directly but can 
emerge only as an enigma that still has to be unraveled.
Kierkegaard develops a “theater of ideas” in which philosophical and exis-
tential problems are performed rather than represented. The performative 
dimension of his work ensues from his interpretation of human existence. 
Although Kierkegaard does not have a unified theory of the self, his pseudo-
nyms all start from the same basic premise: the self has a temporal structure 
that is paradoxical in nature. It is established as a relation between several 
elements that cannot be synthesized with each other. This creates a fragile 
equilibrium that is constantly on the verge of breaking apart. An added prob-
lem is that there is a qualitative difference between the inner world of the 
single individual and the external and collective means of communication by 
which he expresses himself. Kierkegaard tries to bridge this chasm between 
the inner and the outer by turning his oeuvre into a theater of ideas. His 
works not only say something; they also attempt to do something, to have a 
performative effect. To analyze this performative mode of communication, 
I will distinguish between the “categories of performativity” that can be 
derived from Kierkegaard’s works and the “performative writing strategies” 
that animate them. The first concerns the conceptual content, the second, the 
literary form. Their distinction indicates a difference in focus rather than in 
substance.
On the level of conceptual content, Kierkegaard introduces several cat-
egories of performativity. These categories address a type of communication 
that constitutes its own reality rather than representing it after the fact. The 
notion of performativity indicates that this type of communication does not 
refer to a preexisting state of affairs that is communicated. Rather, it con-
fronts the readers with an unresolved contradiction, the content of which still 
has to be unraveled. The communication has a meaningful content, but this 
content is neither fixed nor predefined. It emerges only after it has been actu-
alized by the reader. This usually involves a decision that discloses the view of 
the reader rather than that of the communicator. It was J. L. Austin who first 
introduced the notion of performativity. His main argument was that lan-
guage is not just descriptive and reflective but can actually perform an action. 
(When I give an order, I am not describing that action, but I am performing 
it.) In a similar way, a category of performativity signifies a performative 
act that communicates something (analogous to Austin’s locution), but what 
it communicates is a contradiction that aims to activate the subjectivity of 
readers (analogous to the illocutionary force) by forcing them to respond in 
such a way that they disclose their own views on the matter (analogous to 
the perlocutionary effect).5
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Kierkegaard develops a whole series of categories of performativity. These 
categories not only precede Austin’s analyses of performativity; they also add 
to the tradition that emerged in his wake. Each of them is an original invention 
that is developed in reaction to a specific existential problem. In Practice in 
Christianity, for example, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti- Climacus analyzes 
the performative context in which Christ, as the God- man, operates (SKS 
12:81– 151 / PC 69– 144). To make this analysis possible he introduces sev-
eral categories of performativity, such as “the incognito that demands faith” 
and “offense.” If God would appear in all his glory without an incognito to 
hide his divinity, he would become an idol that can be identified and known 
with certainty. This would cancel out the role of subjectivity. For that reason, 
Anti- Climacus argues, Christ hides himself behind the incognito of a lowly 
human being. By deliberately creating a contradiction between his ordinary 
appearance and his claim of being God, Christ makes himself offensive. In 
this way he turns himself into an object of faith and forces the recipient to 
make a choice that will disclose whether he or she believes in him. Notions 
like incognito and offense are introduced to address the unusual performa-
tive structure of the God- man.6
Kierkegaard’s categories of performativity are interesting in their own 
right. However, they will also be helpful for understanding the performative 
writing strategies underlying his works. We find these performative writing 
strategies on the level of literary form. The aim of these writing strategies 
is to confront the reader with an unresolved existential problem that is not 
drawn into clarity yet but is staged in all its confusions and contradictions. 
In other words, Kierkegaard does not represent a solution in which the prob-
lem has already been overcome; instead, he tries to make the reader aware 
of the problem and let him or her struggle with it. By performing ideas as 
unresolved problems rather than representing them as clear and well- defined 
solutions, Kierkegaard breaks with the Aristotelian tradition of mimetic rep-
resentation. His pseudonym Frater Taciturnus, for instance, introduces the 
notion of a psychological experiment to find a performative writing strat-
egy that no longer relies on representation (compare SKS 6:173– 454 / SLW 
185– 494). Hence Taciturnus no longer relies on Aristotelian catharsis as a 
purification of emotion through a process of identification. Instead, he intro-
duces an alternative catharsis that purifies by activating the subjectivity of the 
reader. This is done by dramatizing an unresolved problem without provid-
ing a way out. A fictional protagonist becomes entangled in a contradiction 
between actuality and ideality that is simultaneously essentially comic and 
essentially tragic. The reader has to decide which of these moods prevails.7 It 
would be a mistake, however, to view this performative writing strategy as a 
kind of postmodern “empty play” that destroys meaning rather than creat-
ing it. The unresolved problems are not meaningless. Rather, they imply an 
excess of meaning that has to be narrowed down by the reader. Other pseu-
donyms, such as Johannes de Silentio, Climacus, Anti- Climacus, and Vigilius 
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Haufniensis, develop similar performative writing strategies. In fact, one 
might even argue that— at least to some extent— Kierkegaard also relies on 
these strategies when he writes under his own name as veronymous author.
Repetition as a Category of Performativity
Repetition is not a philosophical treatise in the traditional sense. It introduces 
repetition as one of the most important categories of modern philosophy, 
without clearly explaining how this category should be understood. On the 
contrary, Kierkegaard ensures that its precise meaning remains constantly in 
dispute. This is illustrative for the changing role of categories in his work. 
Instead of providing well- defined concepts that can be applied outside of 
the concrete contexts in which they are introduced, Kierkegaard develops 
categories of performativity that remain unfinished as long as the reader does 
not put them into action. If these categories are too hastily detached from the 
setting in which they emerge, they will become meaningless.
In its ordinary sense, repetition refers to an event that occurs for a second, 
a third, or any other time. This implies a repetition of the same. Examples 
of this ordinary repetition include a rehearsal (i.e., repeated practice to get 
something firmly in one’s head), a relapse (i.e., return to a previous undesir-
able state), and a reprise (i.e., restaging an earlier production), as well as 
Constantius’s own attempt to repeat his earlier trip to Berlin. Kierkegaard is 
not interested in these ordinary repetitions but tries to address a very differ-
ent type of repetition that is existential rather than ordinary. In contrast to its 
ordinary counterpart, an existential repetition will always emerge as a unique 
event. In order to persist, this unique event has to be repeated. However, it 
does not remain the same as it was throughout this repetition but under-
goes a transition that makes it unique again. There is no “first time” that 
repeats itself a “second time” (as with a touchdown that is repeated in the 
replay). On the contrary, the “first time” repeats itself in another “first time.” 
According to Kierkegaard, this is how subjectivity is structured. Subjectivity 
is repetition, but the main characteristic of this repetition is that it is always 
new. It is no longer a repetition of the same but is a repetition of difference. 
Kierkegaard thus develops an existential philosophy in which subjectivity 
is no longer defined by an essential core that remains the same throughout 
change; instead, subjectivity is now seen as a continuous repetition of differ-
ence. As such, he is one of the first philosophers to redefine the concept of 
identity. Later philosophers, such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Deleuze, will 
follow him in this respect, although they will give a slightly different twist 
to it.
Repetition is structured in such a way that the two manifestations of 
repetition— ordinary and existential— are constantly confused with each 
other. Initially the reader will enter the text as a passive spectator who looks 
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from a distance at the events that happen to the protagonists; however, 
the confusions and misunderstandings will force the reader to become an 
active participant. Constantius achieves this effect by means of a dialectic 
of advance and withdrawal. At several points, a real understanding of exis-
tential repetition is reached. In these moments the category of repetition is 
advanced. However, each time the text will eventually switch back to ordi-
nary repetition, as if the two manifestations of repetition are the same. At 
these moments the category of repetition is withdrawn again. In this way, the 
understanding of repetition is always taken one step forward and two steps 
back. The aim of this dialectic of advance and withdrawal is to activate the 
subjectivity of the reader. In the case of Repetition, this is done by embodying 
repetition in the lives of two protagonists.
The first protagonist is Constantin Constantius, the author- narrator of 
the book who sees himself as a “secret agent in a higher service” whose task 
it is to expose what is hidden (SKS 4:12 / R 135). The second protagonist is 
a young man who has entered into a love relationship with a girl but now 
slowly discovers that he cannot go through with it. Both these protagonists 
become entangled in a discrepancy between the ordinary and the existen-
tial manifestation of repetition. On a theoretical level, Constantius seems to 
understand what existential repetition entails (advance), but when he tries to 
bring it into practice it becomes clear that he has confused it with repetition 
in the ordinary sense (withdrawal). In the case of the young man, the oppo-
site happens. He faces the problem of subjectivity and freedom in practice 
and seeks refuge in the category of existential repetition (advance). However, 
because he lacks a proper understanding of this category, he is satisfied with 
an ordinary repetition (withdrawal). It is the task of the reader to reconstitute 
the category of repetition by taking up the advances and by separating them 
from the withdrawals.
The dialectic of advance and withdrawal can be illustrated by highlighting 
each of its two moments separately. A good example of a withdrawal can 
be found in the Berlin episode, halfway through the first part of the book. 
Instead of analyzing the category of repetition in a systematic way, Constan-
tius decides to conduct an experiment in order “to test the possibility and 
meaning of repetition” (SKS 4:26– 27 / R 150). He does this by undertaking 
an “investigative journey [Opdagelses- Reise]” to Berlin (SKS 4:26 / R 150). 
In his own words: “When I was occupied for some time, at least on occasion, 
with the question of repetition— whether or not it is possible, what impor-
tance it has, whether something gains or loses in being repeated— I suddenly 
had the thought: You can, after all, take a trip to Berlin; you have been there 
once before, and now you can prove to yourself whether a repetition is pos-
sible and what importance it has” (SKS 4:9 / R 131). After many unsuccessful 
attempts to relive his previous experience of the journey to Berlin, Constan-
tius concludes that there is no repetition. This makes him feel ashamed for his 
big words; it seems to him that they “were only a dream from which I awoke 
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to have life unremittingly and treacherously retake everything [tage Alt igjen; 
literally ‘take everything back’] it had given without providing a repetition” 
(SKS 4:45 / R 172). In Constantius’s view, repetition should imply a “giving 
again,” whereas the experiment shows that life “takes everything back.” That 
is why Constantius is forced to conclude, “There is no repetition, and my 
earlier conception of life was victorious” (SKS 4:45 / R 171).
The experiment fails, and the category of repetition is abandoned. The 
reader will not be surprised to learn about this failure. The whole effort 
seemed ludicrous to begin with. How could Constantius even think that it 
would be possible to relive his earlier experiences? What is going on here? 
Has he lost his mind? Or is he trying to make a fool of the reader? The sheer 
absurdity of his experiment already indicates that it cannot be accepted at 
face value. The experiment is doomed to fail from the beginning because it is 
the result of a deliberate misunderstanding. This misunderstanding is never 
explicated in the text. It is only in a later, unpublished note of 1843– 44 that 
Constantius identifies it as such.8 He writes there, “The most interior prob-
lem of the possibility of repetition is expressed externally, as if repetition, if 
it were possible, were to be found outside the individual when in fact it must 
be found within the individual” (SKS 15:69  / R, Suppl., 304). The exter-
nal means by which the experiment is conducted are in direct conflict with 
the existential and inward nature of repetition. By animating this conflict 
rather than resolving it, Constantius forces his readers to decide the issue for 
themselves.
As a category of performativity, repetition can emerge only in the middle 
of confusions and misunderstandings. This does not mean, however, that the 
reader is left completely in the dark. On the contrary, the reader can fall 
back on the advances that have already been made by Constantius and the 
young man. In order to get a better grasp of existential repetition, I will 
highlight several of these advances. A first series of advances is made when 
Constantius opposes the worldview of the ancient Greeks to that of the mod-
erns. According to him, the ancient Greeks relied on recollection, whereas 
modern philosophy turns toward repetition as “the new category that will 
be discovered” (SKS 4:25 / R 148). This category is not available yet but still 
has to be discovered. In fact, as a category of performativity, repetition will 
always remain a discovery in the making. When Constantius refers to the 
Greek worldview, he is thinking especially of Plato, who believed that the 
truth lies in the past but can be retrieved with the help of recollection. By 
situating truth in an originary and prior realm, Plato gives it a universal and 
eternal character. Constantius, on the other hand, introduces a new concept 
of truth. For him the truth is always something yet to come rather than a 
lost origin that has to be retrieved. This truth is not universal and eternal 
but is connected to a fleeting instant that constantly has to be repeated. As 
Constantius remarks, “Repetition and recollection are the same movement, 
except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated 
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backward, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward” (SKS 4:9 / R 
131). From the metaphysical perspective of the ancient Greeks, the truth of 
the individual is understood as a movement that is directed toward the past. 
This truth does not emerge within the individual’s own existence but must be 
conceived as an essence that precedes the individual’s existence. According to 
Constantius, however, this essence is not the truth but is rather the untruth 
of the individual.
Despite the fact that modern philosophy turns toward repetition, it has 
not been able to grasp repetition fully. According to Constantius, this is 
largely due to Hegel and his followers. By reducing repetition to mediation, 
they transferred the problem of subjectivity and freedom from the realm of 
existence to the realm of logic. Constantius rejects this transfer. In his view, 
existence will never comply with the laws of logic. In contrast to the Hegelian 
conception of logical development, Constantius relies on an Aristotelian con-
ception of existential movement. In the aforementioned unpublished note, he 
points out that “when Aristotle long ago said that the transition from possi-
bility to actuality is a κίνησις [motion, change], he was not speaking about the 
possibility and actuality of logic, but about [the possibility and actuality] of 
freedom, and therefore he properly posits movement” (SKS 15:74 / R, Suppl., 
310).9 In Constantius’s reading, κίνησις should not be understood as a medi-
ated progression toward a predetermined goal but as a transition that implies 
a qualitative change. Repetition is the result of such a transition. As Constan-
tius remarks, “The dialectic of repetition is easy, for that which is repeated 
has been— otherwise it could not be repeated— but the very fact that it has 
been makes the repetition into something new” (SKS 4:25 / R 149). Rather 
than a return to what was, repetition implies a transition to a new state. In 
this way it ensures that subjectivity comes into existence again.
The young man, the second protagonist of Repetition, also makes some 
advance in understanding repetition by focusing on the biblical figure of Job. 
In his reading, Job truly embodies repetition. Not because he “has received 
everything double” (SKS 4:79  / R 212), as the young man eventually con-
cludes, but because he “qualifies as an exception” (SKS 4:75 / R 207). Job 
lost his whole family and everything he had, and still he is able to say “the 
Lord gave and the Lord took away.” More important, Job does not despair 
over what has happened to him. He is able to say this without losing his faith 
in God and without accepting that God has been punishing him for his sins. 
Despite everything, Job continues to believe that he is in the right. According 
to the young man, it is Job who gives evidence of “the noble, human, bold 
confidence that knows what a human being is, knows that despite his being 
frail, despite his swift withering away like the flower, that in freedom he still 
has something of greatness, has a consciousness that even God cannot wrest 
from him even though he gave it to him” (SKS 4:76 / R 208). Because of his 
freedom, Job is able to resist his friends’ suggestion that his misfortune is 
a punishment from God. At the same time, he is also able to withstand the 
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ordeal that God has imposed upon him as a test. Neither God nor the human 
being is able to take subjectivity and freedom away from him. For the young 
man this extraordinary manifestation of subjectivity becomes the paradigm 
case of repetition. Nevertheless, despite his advance in understanding, the 
young man proves unable to live up to the standard that is set by Job. Instead, 
when he tries to achieve repetition in his own life, he unintentionally turns it 
into a banality.
The dialectic of advance and withdrawal ensures that the reader has to 
struggle through a series of confusions and misunderstandings. In this way, 
Constantius has turned Repetition into an enigma. This enigma will become 
fruitful only when the reader first identifies the confusions and misunder-
standings and then starts to develop the emerging category of repetition on 
his or her own. The outcome of the book becomes the reader’s responsibility. 
This does not mean that Constantius is simply throwing his readers into an 
abyss of ambiguity and uncertainty. To make them aware of the performative 
structure of his text, he has left a few clues. With the help of these clues it 
becomes possible to reconstruct Constantius’s own thoughts about the per-
formative writing strategy that is employed in Repetition.
Repetition as Philosophical Theater: Constantius’s 
Thoughts on His Performative Writing Strategy
Although Constantius has not directly addressed the dialectic of advance and 
withdrawal, he has left certain clues in which this performative writing strat-
egy is announced. I will focus on three of these clues. The first clue is already 
apparent in the subtitle of the book, A Venture in Experimenting Psychol-
ogy. By calling his book a “venture,” Constantius suggests that the outcome 
of the book cannot be known in advance but will emerge only gradually. 
The notion of “experimenting psychology” indicates that Constantius does 
not want to represent a real- life situation but that he tries to open up an 
experimental realm in which a psychological problem is put on the stage. 
Rather than studying repetition from the perspective of an uninvolved out-
sider, Constantius tries to transform it into something inward that has to be 
taken up by the reader. As he later remarks in a note of 1843– 44, “I wanted 
to depict and make visible psychologically and esthetically; in the Greek 
sense, I wanted to let the concept come into being in the individuality and 
the situation, working itself forward through all sorts of misunderstandings” 
(SKS 15:68 / R, Suppl., 302). The venture in experimenting psychology thus 
becomes a philosophical theater in which ideas and categories are performed 
in a state of confusion.
Constantius finds an earlier example of this philosophical theater in a 
well- known anecdote about Diogenes the Cynic: “When the Eleatics denied 
motion, Diogenes, as everyone knows, came forward [optraadte] as an 
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opponent. He literally did come forward [optraadte], because he did not say 
a word but merely paced back and forth a few times, thereby assuming that 
he had sufficiently refuted them” (SKS 4:9  / R 131). The Danish verb that 
is used here, optræde, has a clear theatrical connotation. Literally it means 
“stepping up” or “coming forward,” but it also refers to the moment an actor 
“makes an appearance” by entering the scene and giving a performance. In 
the anecdote, Diogenes sees no need to debate whether movement is possible. 
Instead, he simply paces back and forth. This little performance sufficiently 
shows that existence does not comply with logic. By pacing back and forth, 
Diogenes performed the physical movement for which he was arguing. Con-
stantius tries to achieve a similar effect by performing existential repetition as 
a movement that ultimately has to be concluded by the reader.
A second clue can be found in Constantius’s concluding letter “to Mr. X. 
Esq., the real reader of this book” (SKS 4:89 / R 223). The letter opens with 
a few remarks about the art of reading. Constantius indicates that he is look-
ing for a type of reader who is willing to make an effort in understanding 
the book, despite being completely bewildered by it. He follows the dictum 
of Clement of Alexandria, who is said to have written in such a way “that 
the heretics [were] unable to understand it” (SKS 4:91  / R 225). The term 
“heretics” here refers to superficial readers who fail to uncover the deliber-
ate misunderstandings in which the protagonists become entangled. For such 
heretics the category of repetition will remain a strange and hazy notion.
In line with his remark about heretics, Constantius predicts that review-
ers, who will try to measure the book on the basis of certain fixed standards, 
will not get anything out of it. The expectations of these reviewers will be 
frustrated because the composition of Repetition differs from that of most 
books. Constantius develops the story in such a way that the course of events 
“is inverse” (SKS 4:92 / R 226). Inverse? This is an odd expression. Inverse 
in what sense? Does Constantius mean that the book is turned upside down? 
Or is he referring to unexpected turning points or strange revisions? It is not 
entirely clear what he intends, but the context suggests that he is juxtapos-
ing two types of compositions: teleological and paradoxical.10 Teleological 
compositions are initially set in motion by a contradiction, but then progress 
toward a higher unity (the Hegelian 1, 2, 3). Constantius is not interested in 
these teleological compositions. In his view, they privilege the universal (logic) 
over the individual and the exception (existence). That is why Constantius 
has developed a new type of composition that is no longer teleological but 
is paradoxical in nature. This principle behind this paradoxical composition 
is aptly captured in the phrase “to kill a man and let him live” (SKS 4:92 / R 
226). When the same man is killed and left alive, any attempt at reconciliation 
will run aground. In other words, the paradoxical composition ensures that 
the contradictions in the text cannot be overcome. The idea of a paradoxical 
composition already indicates how the dialectic of advance and withdrawal 
is generated. Taking one step forward and two steps back, the paradoxical 
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composition generates a circulating movement that echoes Diogenes’s pacing 
back and forth.
The third and most important clue can be found in the digression that 
forms the heart of the Berlin episode. This digression is best understood as 
an extensive mise en abyme, a story within a story that tells us how to per-
form the book we are reading. It deals with two examples of kitsch. The 
first example concerns a cheap and sentimental type of painting that Con-
stantius calls a Nürnberg print.11 He describes this as follows: “There one 
sees a landscape depicting a rural area in general. This abstraction cannot 
be artistically executed. Therefore the whole thing is achieved by contrast, 
namely, by an accidental concretion. And yet I ask everyone if from such a 
landscape he does not get the impression of a rural area in general” (SKS 
4:33 / R 158). Two elements are of importance here. The effect is achieved 
“by contrast” and with the help of “an accidental concretion.” To understand 
what Constantius means by this, it will be helpful to explicate the distinction 
he makes between art and kitsch. According to Constantius, art derives its 
perfection from the way it balances the actual and the ideal. This balance can 
be achieved by giving a faithful representation of an exceptional panorama 
or by elevating a nondescript tableau in an ideal reproduction. In both cases, 
the painter has made sure that the depicted landscape (actuality) is worthy 
of being transformed into art (ideality). Kitsch, on the other hand, is always 
based on a contradiction between actuality and ideality. Although the rural 
area that is depicted in a Nürnberg print is nothing special (actuality), it is 
still immortalized by being painted (ideality). This creates a contrast that 
defies the aesthetic categories of the educated art critic.
Constantius sees in kitsch a model of artistic production that no longer 
relies on representation but is based on a principle of “accidental concre-
tion.” To my mind, “concretion” should be understood here in the geological 
sense. Like a fossil, the Nürnberg print can be viewed as petrifaction of the 
accidental. It generates enormous and universal categories like “the rural area 
in general,” even though these categories emerge only in a singular and acci-
dental form. Constantius compares this to a child who cuts “out of a piece of 
paper a man and a woman who were man and woman in general in a more 
rigorous sense than Adam and Eve were” (SKS 4:33 / R 158).
A second and more extensive example of kitsch can be found in a specific 
type of popular play, the sole purpose of which is to incite laughter. In Dan-
ish and German this type of popular play is called Posse. Its closest English 
equivalents are farce, burlesque, and vaudeville. As Constantius suggests, a 
farce is not based on a plot that unifies the actions into a meaningful whole 
but relies on accidental instances, the effects of which are wholly dependent 
on the mood of the spectator. Constantius seems to view farce as a paradigm 
of subjectivity. He writes, “Its impact depends largely on self- activity and the 
viewer’s improvisation, the particular individuality comes to assert himself in 
a very individual way and in his enjoyment is emancipated from all esthetic 
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obligations to admire, to laugh, to be moved, etc. in the traditional way” (SKS 
4:34 / R 159). In the same way as a Nürnberg print, a farce no longer com-
plies with the aesthetic categories of the educated public and does not rely 
on the “commensurables of the artistic” (SKS 4:38 / R 163). On the contrary, 
a farce demands an incommensurable response that cannot be shared with 
others but solely depends on the individual viewer.
According to Constantius, a farce “must include two, at most three, very 
talented actors or, more correctly, generative geniuses” (SKS 4:36 / R 161). 
These geniuses do not rely on reflection and deliberation but achieve their 
goal by lyrical improvisation. Their talent is exceptional only insofar as they 
“have the courage to venture what the individual makes bold to do only 
when alone, what the mentally deranged do in the presence of everybody” 
(SKS 4:36  / R 161). Constantius illustrates this talent with a remarkable 
description of how Friedrich Beckmann, the leading actor at the Königstädter 
Theater in Berlin, enters the stage: “What Baggesen says of Sara Nickels, that 
she comes rushing on stage with a rustic scene in tow, is true of B[eckmann] 
in the positive sense, except that he comes walking [komme gaaende]. . . . He 
is not only able to walk [gaae], but he is also able to come walking [komme 
gaaende]” (SKS 4:38  / R 163). A distinction is drawn here between two 
types of dramatic action. Ordinary actors just walk onto the stage. Beck-
mann, on the other hand, “is able to come walking.” What is the difference 
between these two types of movement? To understand this we have to look 
more closely at the Danish phrase komme gaaende. This phrase, which is 
repeated no fewer than five times, literally means something like “coming 
while going.”12 This ambiguous movement goes in two directions at once. 
On the one hand, Beckmann is arriving; on the other, he is already leav-
ing. Constantius seems to indicate here that Beckmann does not represent a 
particular intentional action but embodies movement as such. That is why 
Beckmann can play the role of an apprentice without representing him in 
any way. Instead of fully developing this role, he uses it as an incognito. 
Behind this incognito “dwells the lunatic demon of comedy, who quickly 
extricates himself and carries everything away in sheer abandonment” (SKS 
4:38 / R 164). The phrase “coming while going” echoes the instant of transi-
tion on which existential repetition is based. However, Beckmann embodies 
this ambiguous movement of repetition merely in an external way. By letting 
the meaningful world vanish, he gives an impetus to subjectivity. As such, he 
covers only one half of the transition. The other half of the transition has to 
be carried through by the viewer.
The performance of a farce relies on two or three geniuses like Beck-
mann who have a lyrical talent for invoking laughter. The rest of the cast can 
consist of minor actors who do not need to have any special talent. Constan-
tius describes these minor characters in terms similar to those in which he 
described the Nürnberg print. According to him, “the minor characters have 
their effect through that abstract category ‘in general’ and achieve it by an 
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accidental concretion” (SKS 4:37 / R 163). We already saw that an accidental 
concretion is comparable to a fossil, something unimportant and ordinary 
that is immortalized. In the case of a farce, the accidental concretion makes 
“a claim to be the ideal, which it does by stepping onto the artificial world 
of the stage” (SKS 4:37 / R 163). In this way, the farce defies the laws of seri-
ous theater. Instead of developing concrete characters that are thoroughly 
carried out in ideality, the farce remains stuck in accidental situations by 
highlighting something unessential. In serious theater a concrete actuality is 
translated into an abstract ideality by showing something essential that is not 
only valid for the character in question but applies to everybody. In this way, 
it generates universal templates of action that indicate how a courageous or 
chivalrous person is supposed to behave. Farce, on the other hand, moves 
from the abstract to the concrete. An abstract person in general is embodied 
by highlighting something unimportant that is completely accidental. This 
ensures that a farce never reaches ideality but gets stuck in actuality. By put-
ting the accidental on the stage, the farce achieves a comic effect that destroys 
universal templates of action rather than creating them. Instead, it activates 
the viewers’ own productivity and forces them to develop their own template 
of action.
I have analyzed three clues in which the dialectic of advance and withdrawal 
is announced as a deliberate writing strategy that is based on performance 
rather than representation. The first clue indicated that Repetition opens up 
an experimental realm that functions as a theater of ideas. A second clue was 
found in Constantius’s suggestion that he relies on a paradoxical composi-
tion in which two irreconcilable tendencies are placed in tension with each 
other without providing a way out. These first two clues culminated in a 
digression on two forms of kitsch. This digression can be read as a mise en 
abyme. As such it is exemplary for the performative structure of Repetition 
as a whole. Constantius introduced two important notions there: “accidental 
concretion” and “coming while going.” As we saw, an accidental concretion 
concerns the tension between actuality and ideality. This reveals something 
about Kierkegaard’s categories of performativity. The intention of these cat-
egories is also to resist ideality by letting the reader get stuck in actuality. The 
notion of “coming while going,” on the other hand, tells us something about 
the role of performance in Kierkegaard’s theater of ideas. It embodies the 
ambiguous movement of a simultaneous advance and withdrawal.
To conclude, in this essay I have argued that Constantius invents a new way of 
doing philosophy in Repetition. This allows him to introduce existential rep-
etition as a category of performativity. Rather than clarifying what existential 
repetition is, he lets it emerge in a series of confusions and misunderstand-
ings. In this way, the category is advanced and withdrawn at the same time. 
It is the task of the reader to make this dialectic of advance and withdrawal 
fruitful. This performative demand turns Repetition into a theater of ideas. 
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Rather than representing an already finished argument, Constantius performs 
a problem that still has to be unraveled. In this process he provides several 
clues, suggesting that the dialectic of advance and withdrawal is a deliberate 
writing strategy that can take on several forms.
Notes
1. This essay expands upon and adds to ideas introduced in an earlier essay of 
mine that was published in Dutch, “De herhaling van het onherhaalbare: Con-
stantin Constantius over vrijheid en subjectiviteit,” Wijsgerig Perspectief 53, no. 
2 (2013): 30– 37.
2. My approach is inspired by and indebted to three important studies on 
Kierkegaard: Sylviane Agacinski, Aparté: Conceptions and Deaths of Søren 
Kierkegaard, trans. Kevin Newmark (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 
1988); Samuel Weber, “Kierkegaard’s ‘Posse,’ ” in Theatricality as Medium (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 200– 228; Gilles Deleuze, Difference and 
Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Continuum, 2001), 5– 11.
3. Other scholars also have attempted to read Kierkegaard from the perspective 
of theater and performance. Joseph Westfall, for instance, argues “that Kierke-
gaardian authorship is performative, or that the Kierkegaardian author might 
best be understood as a kind of performer.” Westfall therefore focuses on “the 
person, persona or personae to whom authorship of the work is ascribed (author-
ing).” The Kierkegaardian Author: Authorship and Performance in Kierkegaard’s 
Literary and Dramatic Criticism (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 145, 146. 
Although I do not disagree with this approach, I will not be focusing on the 
issue of authorship. Instead, I focus on the existential problems that Kierkegaard 
performs and on the categories of performativity that he invents in the process.
4. Minor writings on theater addressing “categories of performativity” include 
“The Crisis and the Crisis in the Life of an Actress” (SKS 14:93– 107/ CCLA 301– 
26), “Phister as Captain Scipio” (SKS 16:125– 43 / “PCS” 327– 44), and selections 
from the first part of Either/Or (SKS 2 / EO 1). (On these writings by Kierke-
gaard about the theater, and also on his avidness as a theatergoer, see also George 
Pattison’s essay in this volume.— Ed.)
5. J. L. Austin, who first conceptualized “performativity,” introduced a by now 
famous distinction between three aspects of performative communication: the 
locutionary meaning, the illocutionary force, and the perlocutionary effect. The 
locutionary meaning is the sense and reference of an utterance. The illocution-
ary force is the function that the utterance performs when it is being said. For 
example, the phrase “I now pronounce you man and wife” constitutes reality 
as such; it does not refer to a preexisting state of affairs but creates these states 
of affairs; it is self- referential. The perlocutionary effect is the response of the 
listener or reader as a consequence of what is said to him or her, for example, 
anger or fear in response to a threat. This threefold distinction will shed some 
light on the complex movement that is implied in many of Kierkegaard’s perfor-
mative categories. However, Austin’s distinction is too general and too linguistic 
to explain the structure and the intended effect of this complex movement. For 
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instance, this movement is not rule- governed in the limited sense of Austin, and 
it includes fictional statements. Compare J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with 
Words, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); Austin, Philosophical Papers, 
3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
6. For more on the notion of incognito see my article “Incognito,” in Kierke-
gaard’s Concepts, Tome 3: Envy to Incognito, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, William 
McDonald, and Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and 
Resources, vol. 15 (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2014), 231– 38.
7. I have analyzed Taciturnus’s theory of the psychological experiment more
extensively in my article “Psychological Experiment,” in Kierkegaard’s Concepts, 
Tome 5: Objectivity to Sacrifice, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, 
and Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 
15 (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2015), 159– 66.
8. This note is part of several sketches (SKS 15:61– 88 / R, Suppl., 283– 324) in
which Kierkegaard lets Constantius develop a response to J. L. Heiberg’s article 
“Det astronomiske Aar” (1843, “The Astronomical Year”), which discusses Rep-
etition at some length. These sketches were written between December 1843 and 
March 1844 but never published by Kierkegaard.
9. I have slightly modified the English rendering of this sentence to eradicate
an ungrammaticality that is present in the Danish original and that is preserved 
in the Hongs’ translation.
10. For an interesting but different account of the notion of “inverse,” see Arne
Melberg, “Repetition (in the Kierkegaardian Sense of the Term),” Diacritics 20, 
no. 3 (1990): 71– 87.
11. For a discussion of the many references to Nürnberg prints in Kierke-
gaard’s writings, see Ragni Linnet’s essay in the present volume. Linnet finds that 
the particular Nürnberg print described by Constantius approximates one of the 
Entombment, inspired by Raphael.— Ed.
12. Agacinski (Aparté, 165) and Weber (“Kierkegaard’s ‘Posse,’ ” 221– 23) have
also analyzed this particular phrase.
